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I. Introduction
The New York Court of Appeals has a long history as one of
the most distinguished and influential courts in the United
States. Echoing its great Chief Justice Benjamin Cardozo, most
of its judges have striven to formulate sound rules of tort law-
rules that are balanced and fair. Whether one agrees or dis-
agrees with the outcome of the Court's various decisions, accu-
racy has been a hallmark of the Court. That history and
tradition made the 1995 case of Denny v. Ford Motor Co.1 a
maverick ruling by the Court.
In Denny, the Court affirmed a $1.2 million jury award to a
personal injury plaintiff under an "implied warranty" theory,
even though a jury found that the product was "reasonably safe"
and not "defective" under a strict products liability theory.2 As
this article will explain, the Court's decision could reverse
sound and fair public policy developments in products liability
law and create misunderstandings and confusion in product lia-
bility jurisprudence. In a nutshell, this is why.
First, by permitting plaintiffs to take "two bites at the ap-
ple" to establish liability-one under an implied warranty "con-
sumer expectations" test and another under a strict liability
"risk/utility" test-the decision will fuel unnecessary, prolonged
litigation. The decision is out of step with public policy ap-
proaches of other state courts, state legislatures, the new draft
Restatement of the Law of Torts: Products Liability, and the
Council of the European Communities' Directive on product lia-
bility, which have established one coherent and clear set of
rules regarding when a manufacturer or product seller will be
subject to liability.3
Second, by holding manufacturers and sellers subject to ab-
solute liability under a hazy, undefined implied warranty the-
ory, the decision departs from the clear trend in almost every
1. 87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1995).
2. See id.
3. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995); Victor Schwartz & Mark Behrens, The Road To Fed-
eral Product Liability Reform, 55 MD. L. Rev. 1363 (1996); Council Directive 85/
374, 1985 O.J. (L 210/29). Sections 1-2, inter alia, of the new products liability
Restatement was given tentative approval by the body of the American Law Insti-
tute in May 1995. See 17 A.L.I. Rep. 4, at 1 (1995).
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state: a recognition that fault must be the bottom line basis of
liability in design defect and failure to warn cases.
Third, and perhaps most disturbing, is the fact that the
Court's decision is formed around a misunderstanding of two
key predicates: (1) how the implied warranty cause of action is
applied in personal injury cases alleging design "defect," and (2)
the basic meaning of the new draft Restatement of the Law of
Torts: Products Liability.4 In light of the Court's prestige and
credibility in the community of judges, we are concerned that
these misunderstandings could be replicated elsewhere.
Respectfully, it is submitted that the New York Court of
Appeals should overrule the Denny decision.
II. The Facts In Denny v. Ford Motor Co.
Plaintiff Nancy Denny was injured in June 1986 when the
four-wheel drive vehicle she was driving, a Ford Motor Com-
pany ("Ford") Bronco II, overturned during an evasive maneu-
ver to avoid a deer that had walked directly into her vehicle's
path.5 Ms. Denny and her husband sued Ford in federal court
in New York, alleging claims for negligence, strict products lia-
bility, and breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. 6
The case went to trial in October 1992. 7
The trial focused on the design characteristics of small four-
wheel-drive utility vehicles.8 Plaintiffs' counsel argued that
small "4x4" vehicles in general, and the Bronco II in particular,
are less stable and present a higher risk of rollover than con-
ventional passenger automobiles during everyday on-road
travel.9 Plaintiffs' counsel also argued that Ford's marketing of
the Bronco II stressed the vehicle's suitability for commuting
and for suburban and city driving. 10 Plaintiffs testified that
4. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1995).
5. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 251, 662 N.E.2d 730, 731, 639
N.Y.S.2d 250, 251 (1995).
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 252, 662 N.E.2d at 731, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 251.
9. See id. at 252, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
10. See id.
1997]
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they were attracted to the Bronco II for its perceived safety ben-
efits and were not interested in its off-road capabilities. 1
Ford's counsel argued at trial that the Bronco II had been
intended to be sold as an off-road vehicle and not as a conven-
tional passenger automobile.' 2 Ford also contended that the
Bronco II's design characteristics of which plaintiff com-
plained-high center of gravity, short wheel base, and specially
tailored suspension system-were important to preserve the ve-
hicle's ability to drive over obstacles, such as fallen logs and
rocks, and over uneven and rugged terrain. 3
At the close of evidence, the trial court submitted plaintiffs'
claims to the jury, despite Ford's objection that the strict prod-
ucts liability and breach of implied warranty causes of action
were identical.' 4 The jury ruled in favor of Ford on the strict
liability claim, finding that the Bronco II was not "defective."15
The jury found for the plaintiff, however, on the implied war-
ranty claim, and awarded a $1.2 million judgment.' 6
Ford subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing that the
jury's finding on the breach of implied warranty claim was ir-
reconcilable with its finding on the strict products liability
claim.' 7 The trial court rejected Ford's argument, holding that
the "inconsistency issue" had been waived and that, in any
event, the verdict was not inconsistent.'8
Ford appealed the trial court's decision to the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. 19 In December 1994, a majority of the
Second Circuit held that Ford's trial conduct had not resulted in
a waiver of the inconsistency issue.20 In addition, the Second
Circuit, reasoning that the outcome of the appeal depended
11. See id. at 252-53, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
12. See id. at 252, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
13. See id. at 252, 662 N.E.2d at 731-32, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 251-52.
14. See id. at 253, 662 N.E.2d at 732, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
15. See id. at 254, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253. Plaintiffs' cause of
action for negligence was also submitted to the jury, but the claim was rejected on
proximate cause grounds. See id. at 254 n.1, 662 N.E.2d at 733 n.1, 639 N.Y.S.2d
at 253 n.1.
16. See id. at 254, 662 N.E.2d at 733, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 253.
17. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 1993 WL 219759, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 15,
1993).
18. See id. at *4.
19. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 42 F.3d 106, 107 (2d Cir. 1994).
20. See id.
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upon the proper application of New York law, certified three is-
sues to the New York Court of Appeals: (1) whether the strict
products liability claim and the breach of implied warranty
claim are identical; (2) whether, if the claims are different, the
strict products liability claim is broader than the implied war-
ranty claim and encompasses the latter; and (3) whether, if the
claims are different and a strict liability claim may fail while an
implied warranty claim succeeds, the jury's finding of no prod-
uct defect is reconcilable with its finding of an implied warranty
breach. 21 The New York Court of Appeals accepted the Second
Circuit's certified questions in January 1995.22
On December 5, 1995, the New York Court of Appeals, in
an opinion written by Judge Vito Titone, held: (1) under New
York's "risk/utility" balancing test for determining whether a
design is defective for purposes of imposing strict liability, the
jury could properly find that the Bronco II's utility as an off-
road vehicle outweighed the risk of injury resulting from rol-
lover accidents and that the vehicle was, therefore, not "defec-
tive"; (2) under the contract-based "consumer expectations" test,
the jury could also find that the same features which make a
Bronco II desirable for off-road use made the vehicle at issue
unfit for the "ordinary" purpose of suburban driving on paved
roads, thus violating the implied warranty of merchantability;
and (3) the jury could simultaneously have concluded that the
Bronco II's utility as an off-road vehicle outweighed the risk of
injury from rollover accidents, while at the same time, finding
that the vehicle was not safe for the "ordinary purpose" of rou-
tine driving on paved public roads. 23
21. See id at 107-08, 111-12.
22. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 84 N.Y.2d 1018, 647 N.E.2d 117, 622
N.Y.S.2d 911 (1995).
23. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co. 87 N.Y.2d 248, 254, 264, 662 N.E.2d 730,
733, 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 253, 259 (1995). For subsequent history confirming
answer to certified question, see Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 79 F.3d 12 (2d Cir.
1996).
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III. The New York Court Finds Subtle Differences In
Determination of "Defect" Under Strict Liability In Tort And
U.C.C.-Based Implied Warranty Theory And Affirms The
Jury's Award
The majority in Denny reasoned that, while claims of strict
products liability and breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability coexist and are often used interchangeably,
there is, nevertheless, a subtle difference in the way "defect" is
determined under each theory. 24 The Court apparently found
this distinction to be a defining difference.
Under New York law, the Court wrote, imposition of strict
liability for an alleged design "defect" is to be determined by
reference to a risk/utility calculus which involves consideration
of a number of "policy-driven factors."25 As the Court observed,
this test is functionally synonymous with the "reasonableness"
inquiry used in traditional negligence cases.26
By way of comparison, the Court wrote, the notion of "de-
fect" in U.C.C.-based breach of implied warranty claims re-
quires an inquiry only into whether the product was "fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."27 The test
focuses on consumer expectations and involves "true 'strict' lia-
bility," since recovery may be obtained without regard to fault
on the part of the manufacturer.28
The Court explained the dichotomy it found between the
negligence-like "defect" analysis applied in strict products lia-
bility actions and the "consumer expectations" analysis applied
24. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 256, 622 N.E.2d 730, 734-35,
639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 254-55 (1995).
25. See id. at 257, 662 N.E.2d at 735, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255. Factors to be con-
sidered by the trier of fact include: (1) the product's utility to the public as a whole;
(2) the product's utility to the individual user; (3) the likelihood that the product
will cause injury; (4) the availability of a safer design; (5) the possibility of design-
ing and manufacturing the product so that it is safer, but remains functional and
reasonably priced; (6) the degree of awareness of the product's potential danger
that can reasonably be attributed to the injured user; and (7) the manufacturer's
ability to spread the cost of any safety-related design changes. See id. (citing Voss
v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102,450 N.E.2d 204,208-09,463 N.Y.S.2d
398 (1983)).
26. See Denny, 87 N.Y.2d at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 735, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 255.
27. See id. at 258, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256 (citing UCC § 2-
314(2)(c)).
28. See id. at 258-59, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
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in breach of implied warranty actions as springing from differ-
ent "doctrinal underpinnings."29 Implied warranty actions, the
Court said, have their origins in contract law and attempt to
provide a remedy for a purchaser's disappointed expectations.30
In contrast, strict liability actions are a part of tort law and in-
volve policy questions regarding whether and to what extent
costs for physical injury or property damage should be shifted to
those who make and sell products.31
Applying the two diverse methods for determining "defect"
to the evidence presented at trial, the Court noted that Ford
took the position that the design features of the Bronco II of
which the plaintiffs complained (i.e., high center of gravity,
short wheel base, and specially tailored suspension system)
were important to preserve the vehicle's utility over the highly
irregular terrain that typifies off-road travel.32 Ford's proof in
this regard was relevant to the strict products liability risk/util-
ity calculus, which required the jury to determine whether the
Bronco II's utility as an off-road vehicle outweighed the risk of
injury resulting from rollover accidents when the vehicle was
used for other driving tasks.33
Plaintiffs' proof, on the other hand, focused on the market-
ing of the Bronco II for suburban driving and everyday road
travel.3 Plaintiffs also adduced proof that the same design
characteristics which allow the Bronco II to be used off-road
may make the vehicle more susceptible than conventional
automobiles to rollover accidents during evasive maneuvers on
paved roads.3 5 This evidence was used to support plaintiffs' ar-
gument that routine highway and street driving was the "ordi-
nary purpose" for which the Bronco II was sold and that it was
not "fit" for that purpose.3 6
In light of the overall evidence, the Court held that the jury
could have simultaneously concluded that the Bronco II was not
defective for purposes of strict products liability, because its
29. See id. at 259, 662 N.E.2d at 736, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 262, 662 N.E.2d at 738, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 263, 662 N.E.2d at 738, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
35. See id.
36. See id.
1997] 365
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utility as an off-road vehicle outweighed the risk of injury from
on-road rollover accidents, and that the vehicle was not safe for
the "ordinary purpose" of routine driving on paved public
roads.37 Accordingly, the Court answered the Second Circuit's
first two certified questions in the negative and certified ques-
tion number three in the affirmative. 38 The Court's holding is
distinctive because the utility against which the risk was to be
weighed for strict liability purposes was not the same as the
"ordinary purpose" for which the product was allegedly mar-
keted and sold to the plaintiff.39
IV. The Dissent's Position
The majority's decision to permit plaintiffs "two bites at the
apple"-one under a strict liability "risk/utility" test and an-
other under an implied warranty "consumer expectations"
test-came under solid criticism by Judge Richard D. Simons,
who wrote a strong and well-reasoned dissent.40
Judge Simons accepted the majority's holding that strict
products liability and breach of implied warranty causes of ac-
tion are not identical, but argued that a strict products liability
claim is broader than and encompasses an implied warranty
claim in the context of personal injury tort litigation.41 In addi-
tion, Judge Simons strongly suggested that the majority should
have adopted "risk/utility" as the single standard for determin-
ing "defectiveness" in all personal injury design defect actions.42
The consumer expectations standard, he emphasized, has "no
place" in personal injury tort design defect litigation.43
Judge Simons concluded that, under a uniform "risk/util-
ity" standard, the jury could not logically determine that the
Bronco II was not defective for purposes of strict liability and
then find for plaintiffs on the breach of implied warranty
37. See id.
38. See id. at 264, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
39. See id. at 263, 662 N.E.2d at 738-39, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 258-59.
40. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co. 87 N.Y.2d 248, 264-73, 662 N.E.2d 730, 739-
45, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 259-65 (1995).
41. See id. at 264, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259 (Simons, J.,
dissenting).
42. See id. at 265, 662 N.E.2d at 739-40, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259-60.
43. See id. at 265, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
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claim.44 Accordingly, Judge Simons indicated that he would an-
swer the Second Circuit's first two certified questions "no and
yes," and would, therefore, find it unnecessary to answer the
third certified question.45
V. The Denny Opinion Reflects An Unsound Step Backward
In Tort Law
A. The Evolution of Strict Products Liability
Prior to New York Judge Cardozo's landmark decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.46 in 1916, tort relief against
negligent manufacturers was effectively barred under the priv-
ity rule set forth almost seventy-five years earlier in Winterbot-
tom v. Wright.47 MacPherson removed the privity barrier in
negligence cases and marked the beginning of the modern negli-
gence law of products liability.48 After MacPherson, courts
moved along two different paths toward imposing strict liability
in tort on commercial distributors of defective products.
On the tort/negligence path, courts expanded the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur49 to ease the considerable evidentiary bur-
den on plaintiffs of proving fault on the part of manufacturers. 50
This development was of some help to plaintiffs, but it did not
provide a sure-footed path for plaintiffs to prevail when prod-
ucts had a real defect in manufacture or construction.51 A man-
44. See id. at 266, 662 N.E.2d at 740, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
45. See id. at 264, 662 N.E.2d at 739, 639 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
46. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
47. 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842).
48. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 96, at 682-83 (5th ed. 1984); JOHN W. WADE ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 699 (9th ed. 1994).
49. Res ipsa loquitur is defined as "[tihe thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable
presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that instrumentality causing injury was in defendants' exclusive control, and that
the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in absence of negligence."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
50. See Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). See gener-
ally Fleming James, Jr., Proof of the Breach in Negligence Cases (Including Res
Ipsa Loquitur), 37 VA. L. REV. 179, 225-28 (1951).
51. Plaintiffs who litigated without the benefit of a res ipsa inference faced
several roadblocks to recovery, including (1) limitations on the manufacturer's
duty of care, (2) difficulties in proving that the defendant was in fact negligent,
especially given the fact that the product at the time of the accident was in the
control of the user and not the defendant, (3) rules pertaining to proximate cause,
1997] 367
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ufacturer could dispel the inference of defect by presenting
sufficient evidence to show that due care was used in the manu-
facture of the product (e.g., by presenting evidence of the use of
quality control measures) 52 or by suggesting alternative causes
for the accident. 53
At about the same time, strict liability was also developing
in the form of the implied warranties of merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose. 54 These warranties were ini-
tially developed to insure that products properly performed the
job that the buyer contracted to obtain,55 but were soon inter-
preted to also embrace reasonable safety and provide recovery
for personal injury. 56
The technique of implying a warranty meant that the obli-
gation became a part of the contract and suggested that only
persons in privity with the defendant could recover.57 Yet, by
employing a number of new theories, courts began to use their
ingenuity to eliminate the privity requirement in contract cases
resulting in personal injury.58
and (4) defenses such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. See Page
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning Of "Defect" In The Manufacture
And Design Of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 560 (1969) [hereinafter Manu-
facturer's Liability]; W. Page Keeton, Products Liability-Design Hazards And The
Meaning Of Defect, 10 CUMB. L. REV. 293, 296 (1979) [hereinafter Products
Liability].
52. See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593,
595 (1980).
53. See Aaron D. Twerski, From Risk-Utility To Consumer Expectations: En-
hancing The Role of Judicial Screening In Product Liability Litigation, 11 HOF-
sTRA L. REV. 861, 906 (1983).
54. See generally Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products-The Drift Toward
Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv. 963, 1013-14 (1957).
55. See John W. Wade, On The Nature Of Strict Tort Liability For Products,
44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829 (1973) [hereinafter On the Nature Of Strict Tort Liability].
56. See John W. Wade, Strict Tort Liability For Products: Past, Present And
Future, 13 CAP. U. L. REv. 335, 341 (1984).
57. See Products Liability, supra note 51, at 301.
58. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 634 (Wash. 1913) (noting
the development of several exceptions to the general privity requirement, includ-
ing: (1) where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous kind; (2)
where the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the article;
and (3) where the defendant has been negligent in some respect with reference to
the sale or construction of a thing not imminently dangerous). For instance, courts
resorted to ideas such as agency relationships, covenants flowing with the goods,
and of third-party beneficiary. See Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Lia-
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Finally, in 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court's epochal
decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,5 9 brought an
end to the barrier of privity in implied warranty actions involv-
ing personal injury.6° Still, recovery for plaintiffs remained
complicated by procedural hurdles found in other contract as-
pects of warranty law, such as the notice requirement and
availability of defendants to issue disclaimers. 61 Untutored con-
sumers often found themselves barred from bringing a war-
ranty action.62
The first clear decision to recognize privity-free strict liabil-
ity in tort was Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,63 a 1963
California Supreme Court case, where Judge Traynor declared
that a "manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without in-
spection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to
a human being."64 A year later, Justice Traynor's watershed de-
cision proved effective in persuading the American Law Insti-
tute to apply "strict liability" to all products in Section 402A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.6 5 Thereafter, the rule of
strict product liability rapidly swept the country and became
the common law of most states.6 Its reign, however, has not
been entirely smooth.
bility Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974,
991 (1966).
59. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
60. William L. Prosser, The Fall Of The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MiNN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Fall Of The Citadel]. Dean Pros-
ser was Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts when Section 402A was
adopted. See Restantement (Second) of Torts introduction at viii (1965).
61. See Page Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the Manufacturer's Negli-
gence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675, 676-77 (1963); Manufacturer's Liability, supra note 51,
at 560; Products Liability, supra note 51, at 296.
62. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 96, at 691; Birnbaum, supra note 52,
at 595.
63. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
64. Id. at 900.
65. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965).
66. See WADE ET AL., supra note 48, at 717. See generally John W. Wade, Tort
Liability For Products Causing Physical Injury And Article 2 Of The U.C.C., 48
Mo. L. REv. 1, 24 (1983) (explaining that the Greenman decision and Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts were welcomed because they offered a "more
logical and more satisfactory explanation of the central underlying idea behind the
cases" in which courts used various tactics to avoid contract rules and impose what
was essentially strict liability against product liability defendants).
1997] 369
11
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:359
B. Flirtation and Rejection of Liability Without Defect
It has taken thirty years to develop settled logical structure
in strict products liability law. Most courts now accept that the
test for imposing liability against a manufacturer for alleged de-
fect based on design or failure to warn is essentially the same.
A fair number of courts accept that the test is the same whether
the suit is based on strict liability or negligence. 67 True "strict
liability" is applied as the authors of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts intended-to manufacturing or construction defects.68
In this context, the doctrine has operated well. By way of con-
trast, most courts have recognized that the application of true
"strict liability" in design or warnings cases is unfair and un-
sound, because it can produce uncertain, open-ended liability,
stifle innovation, and create pockets of uninsurability. 69
Accordingly, most courts have rejected arguments of some
plaintiff lawyers that manufacturers should make their prod-
ucts safer than is technologically feasible or that manufacturers
warn of unknowable risks.7° Similarly, almost all courts have
67. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LABILIrrY
§ 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
68. See id. § 2(a).
69. See generally James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review Of Manufacturers'
Conscious Design Choices: The Limits Of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531,
1554 (1973) ("Despite the institutional advantages it might hold, absolute manu-
facturers' liability had been unanimously and emphatically rejected by the
courts.").
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmts. j and k (1965); RE-
STATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmts.j and k (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995). The principal founding court of modern products liability law,
the Supreme Court of California, recognized this fact in Brown v. Superior Court,
751 P.2d 470, 477, 480 (Cal. 1988). A five-year study conducted by Reporters of the
American Law Institute came to the same conclusion. See AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, 2 REPORTERS' STUDY ENTERPRISE ON RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY
56 (1991). See also John W. Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 740 (1983). Exceptions
include Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La. 1986) (holding
asbestos manufacturer liable even though the manufacturer established that it did
not know and reasonably could not have known of the inherent danger posed by its
product), Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982) (hold-
ing that manufacturers of asbestos products may not raise "state of the art" de-
fense, i.e., that the danger of which they failed to warn was undiscovered at the
time the products were marketed and that it was undiscoverable given the state of
the scientific knowledge at that time), and Simmons v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co.,
596 N.E.2d 318 (Mass. 1992) (holding machine manufacturer liable despite-its con-
tention that the risk involved was not reasonably foreseeable). Halphen and
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refused to impose liability for risks which cannot be eliminated
without depriving the consumer of the usefulness or desirability
of the product. 71
In sum, the majority of courts have understood that good
public policy supports the application of true "strict liability"
only in manufacturing defect cases, not in cases alleging defect
in design or warnings. 72 Consequently, they have wisely
adopted the rule of "reasonableness" as the governing standard
for liability in design defect and failure to warn cases. 73
As will be detailed below, this modern jurisprudence of
products liability has been incorporated in the new tentative
draft of the Restatement of the Law of Torts: Products
Liability.74
C. Denny Case Amounts To Rejection of Clear Trend Based
on Sound Policy
Contrary to the clear, logical trend in the law toward the
use of fault-based concepts in design defect and failure to warn
cases, the Denny case moves New York liability law in the oppo-
Beshada were subsequently overruled by legislation so as to require proof of defect.
See N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:58C-3(a)(3) (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.56(1)
(1991).
71. This principle is supported by comment i to Section 402 A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A cmt. i (1965).
Courts have generally supported this principle regardless of whether the court be-
lieved it was a "good idea" for people to use such products as tobacco, see, e.g.,
Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985), affd,
849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988), alcohol, see, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1991), convertible automobiles, see, e.g., Delvaux v.
Ford Motor Co., 764 F.2d 469 (7th Cir. 1985), or motorcycles, see, e.g., Kutzler v.
AMF Harley-Davidson, 550 N.E.2d 1236 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). An exception was
Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (holding handgun manufac-
turer strictly liable for injury resulting from properly functioning "Saturday Night
Special"). Kelley was subsequently overruled by legislation. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 36-I(h)(1) (1996).
72. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 52, at 593; Victor E. Schwartz, The
Death of "Super Strict Liability": Common Sense Returns To Tort Law, 27 GONZ. L.
REV. 179, 180 (1991/92) [hereinafter Death of "Super Strict Liability"].
73. See James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision Of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1532-
33 (1992). These sound rules have been incorporated into the new Restatement of
the Law of Torts: Products Liability. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY §§ 1-2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
74. See generally RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 2 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1995).
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site direction. The New York Court of Appeals, by adopting an
illogical version of the "consumer expectations" standard which
allows for liability to be imposed regardless of fault,75 decided
that the rule of "reasonableness" should not apply in New
York-manufacturers and sellers (e.g., Ford) of nondefective
products (e.g., Ford Bronco II vehicles) can be held absolutely
liable under implied warranty law for personal injuries. 76
The Court's decision means that a plaintiff who chooses to
allege liability under a breach of implied warranty theory can
argue that any evidence relevant only to the risk/utility analy-
sis or regarding the feasibility of alternative designs should be
excluded.77 If that argument is accepted, the jury would not
learn that alternative designs may be impossible or would make
the product unsafe or unfit in other respects. 78
75. Some versions of the "consumer expectations" tests will not allow for deci-
sions that go beyond what is feasible in design cases and which is known in warn-
ings cases. See generally Birnbaum, supra note 52, at 615-17.
76. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639
N.Y.S.2d 250 (1995). The Court's holding is particularly ironic in light of the fact
that strict products liability was developed by courts as a cure for the procedural
hurdles that often complicate recoveries for plaintiffs in implied warranty actions.
In an unusual twist, the Denny decision will sometimes result in an implied war-
ranty claim proving superior to a strict liability claim for plaintiffs involved in per-
sonal injury design defect actions.
77. See James A. Henderson, Jr., & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing The American
Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1263, 1295 (1991) (noting that, where design defect liability is divorced from
reasonableness, a defendant can be held liable even if it is established "that an
alternative design would [be] more dangerous than the one actually used").
78. See generally Hayes v. Larsen's Mfg. Co., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D. Me.
1994) (fire extinguisher attached to wall in school hallway presents risk that per-
sons who sit beneath it may bump their heads, but the location makes the product
more accessible in the event of a fire); Mowery v. Mercury Marine Div. of Bruns-
wick Corp., 773 F. Supp. 1012, 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1991) (installing propeller blade on
boat may reduce risk of being struck by blade, but may also result in injuries from
decreased ability to maintain control at normal speeds); Self v. General Motors
Corp., 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579 (Cal. App. 1974) (protection provided by a vehicle for
"head-on collisions may be at the expense of protection against one that is broad-
side, for like an army in battle the vehicle can't be uniformly strong at all points
and under all conditions"), overruled on other grounds sub nom. Soule v. General
Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal. 1994); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d
379, 384 (Tex. 1995) (front-end loaders with non-removable rollover protection de-
vices may be safer in open areas, but the device may have no utility in low clear-
ance areas where the product cannot be used at all unless the device is removed).
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D. "Consumer Expectations" Is An Inappropriate Test For
Design Liability
The New York Court of Appeals' version of the "consumer
expectations" test is neither appropriate nor useful. It provides
no standard for determining legitimate consumer expecta-
tions.79
As the late distinguished Dean John Wade, a Reporter for
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, said: "In many situations,
particularly involving design matters, the consumer would not
know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe
the product could be made."80 Indeed, "[t]he vague expectations
of consumers probably oscillate between never expecting a prod-
uct to injure them (on the theory that 'it will never happen to
me') and actually expecting some products to be 'lemons."'8' As
the Denny case demonstrates, the former notion can result in
the identification of products as being dangerously defective
when they are not.8 2
Thus, the drafters of the Model Uniform Product Liability
Act83 did not include the consumer expectations test in their
definition of defect.84 They wrote: "The consumer expectation
test takes subjectivity to its most extreme end. Each trier of
fact is likely to have a different understanding of abstract con-
sumer expectations. Moreover, most consumers are not famil-
79. See Twerski, supra note 53, at 901.
80. On The Nature Of Strict Tort Liability, supra note 55, at 829. See also
Paul D. Rheingold, What Are The Consumer's "Reasonable Expectations"?, 22 Bus.
LAw. 589, 593 n.17 (1967).
81. William C. Powers, Jr., The Persistence of Fault in Products Liability, 61
TEX_ L. REv. 777, 796-97 (1983). See also James E. Montgomery & David G. Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective
Products, 27 S.C. L. REv. 803, 823 (1976); David A. Fischer, Products Liability-
The Meaning Of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REV. 339, 348-52 (1974).
82. See Products Liability, supra note 51, at 303. See also Denny v. Ford Mo-
tor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 270, 662 N.E.2d 730, 743, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 263 (1995)
(Simons, J., dissenting).
83. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILrrY ACT, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714 (1979). The Model Uniform Product Liability Act was authored by the
United States Department of Commerce Task Force on Product Liability and Acci-
dent Compensation, chaired by one of this article's authors. See generally Victor E.
Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act-A Brief Overview, 33 VAND. L. REV.
579, 580-82 (1980).
84. See MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LiALTY AT § 104, reprinted in 44 Fed.
Reg. 62,714, at 62,721 (1979).
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iar with the details of the manufacturing process and cannot
abstractly evaluate conscious design alternatives." 5 Others
have also noted that the test tends to be unworkable for third
parties and bystanders who do not have any expectations about
product performance. 86
VI. The Majority Opinion Misunderstands The Application
Of Implied Warranty In Personal Injury Tort Cases
The New York Court of Appeals based its holding, in part,
on its assumption that breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability is a separate and independent remedy from
strict products liability, because the former is retained in New
York's version of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), while
the latter is found in the common law.8 7 Assuming that the
Court wishes to continue to mix the state's tort law with a con-
tract doctrine, the Court should clarify how implied warranty is
applied in personal injury actions.
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, the concept of implied
warranty's historical and doctrinal roots, when utilized in cases
regarding personal injury or damage to property, is grounded in
tort, not contract.88 The principle of "reasonableness" that con-
trols the "risk/utility" framework is an integral part of implied
warranty of merchantability under the U.C.C.89 The fact that
85. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 104 Analysis, reprinted in 44
Fed. Reg. 62,714, at 62,724 (1979).
86. See Twerski, supra note 53, at 907.
87. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 256, 662 N.E.2d 730, 734,
639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 254 (1995).
88. See, e.g., Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 429 (N.D. Ind.
1965) (stating that strict liability in tort is "hardly more than what exists under
implied warranty when stripped of the contract doctrines of privity, disclaimer,
requirements of notice of defeat, and limitation through inconsistencies with ex-
press warranties"). See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 48, § 96, at 680-81; Page
Keeton, Product Liability And The Meaning Of Defect, 5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30, 36-37
(1973); William Prosser, Spectacular Change: Products Liability in General, 36
CLEVELAND BAR ASS'N J. 149, 167-68; Fall Of The Citadel, supra note 60, at 802;
John W. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L.
REV. 551, 552-53 (1980); Roger J. Traynor, The Ways And Meanings Of Defective
Products And Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 365-66 (1965).
89. For example, the Official Comment to § 2-314 provides, among other
things, that whether "the seller exercised care in the manufacture, processing or
selection of the goods is relevant to the issue of whether the [implied] warranty [of
merchantability] was in fact broken." U.C.C. § 2-314 cmt. 13 (emphasis added).
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the U.C.C. provides a separate statutory remedy, and is gov-
erned by unique procedural requirements, does not mean that
one must engraft substantive differences on implied warranty of
merchantability. 90
The historical underpinning of the implied warranty of
merchantability does not require the "merchant" to do the im-
possible. Consumer expectations must be reasonable under the
circumstances. The standard should not permit recovery in a
design defect case where no alternative feasible design was pos-
sible. It also should not permit recovery in a failure to warn
case where the merchant neither knew nor could have known
about a risk.
VII. The Majority Opinion Misinterprets A Core Component
Of The New Restatement (Third) of Torts
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the New York Court
of Appeals' opinion in Denny is the Court's misinterpretation of
a fundamental section of the new draft Restatement of the Law
of Torts: Products Liability.91 In support of its decision to rec-
Numerous other provisions of the U.C.C. also contain "reasonableness" standards.
See U.C.C. § 2-103(b) ("Good faith" defined as "honesty in fact and the observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing"); U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(a) ("the
buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered
any breach notify the seller... or be barred from any remedy"); U.C.C. § 2-706
(requiring that resale be made in a commercially reasonable manner). See gener-
ally Debra L. Goetz et al., Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions: An
Update, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1207 (1987) ("For the most part, courts use a
reasonableness standard to determine whether section 2-314(2)'s requirements
have been met.").
90. See, e.g., Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273, 1284 (Haw. 1992)
([An implied warranty claim for personal injuries "should be governed by the
same policies which . . . shape the elements of a tort strict products liability
claim."); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 733 (3d Cir. 1976) (examining New Jersey
law) ("Since 1960 the terminology of liability has changed from 'implied warranty'
to 'strict liability' but the jural foundation of liability has remained unchanged,"
and, accordingly, strict liability and implied warranty are substantively the
same.); Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 326 n.15 (Alaska 1970) ("[Aluthorities
have agreed that there should be no distinction made in products liability cases
between recovery under an implied warranty theory and recovery under strict lia-
bility in tort.").
91. See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LLABILrry § 2 (Tenta-
tive Draft No. 2, 1995).
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ognize implied warranty as a claim independent of strict liabil-
ity in tort,92 the Court said:
[Alithough the drafters of the Third Restatement have endorsed
risk/utility analysis for design defect cases sounding in tort, they
also have made clear that claims based on warranty theories are
"not within the scope" of the newly drafted section and are, in fact,
"unaffected by it" (Restatement [Third] of Torts: Products Liabil-
ity, [Tentative Draft No. 2, March 13, 1995] § 2, comment m, at
42). Further, the drafters have noted that "[w]arranty law as a
body of legal doctrine separate from tort may impose legal obliga-
tions that go beyond those set forth" in the Restatement of Torts
(id., comment q, at 46).93
Contrary to the Court's opinion, however, Comment m to Sec-
tion 2 explains:
Claims based on product defect at time of sale or other distribu-
tion must meet the requisites set forth in § 2(a), § 2(b), or § 2(c). As
long as these requisites are met, the traditional doctrinal catego-
ries of negligence, strict liability, or implied warranty of
merchantability may be utilized in doctrinally characterizing the
claim.94
Clearly, the new draft Restatement does not support the Court's
interpretation.
The Court's error may have stemmed from a sentence found
in the last paragraph of Comment m, which states:
Claims based on misrepresentation, express warranty, and im-
plied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, in particular, are
not within the scope of the Sections in this Chapter and thus are
unaffected by it. 95
These warranty theories were not at issue in the Denny action
and do not support the New York Court of Appeals' holding.
The distinction that the new draft Restatement draws be-
tween claims for implied warranty of merchantability, the claim
at issue in the Denny action, and other warranty claims, i.e.,
misrepresentation, express warranty, and the implied warranty
92. See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 87 N.Y.2d 248, 261, 662 N.E.2d 730, 737,
639 N.Y.S.2d 250, 257 (1995).
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (Ten-
tative Draft No. 2, 1995) (emphasis added).
95. Id. (emphasis added).
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of fitness for particular purpose, is an important one to main-
tain in the case law. Otherwise, as the new Restatement cau-
tions: "To allow ... factually identical risk-utility claims to be
brought under different doctrinal labels generates confusion
and may result in inconsistent verdicts."96 This concern is vali-
dated by the inconsistent jury verdict in the Denny case.
VIII. Conclusion
The respect given the New York Court of Appeals has de-
veloped from generations of reasoned, careful decisionmaking.
The Court's opinion in Denny v. Ford Motor Co. departs from
that tradition. Because of that tradition, however, courts in
other states could look to the Denny case as a beacon of the law,
not as an opinion that is based on an erroneous interpretation of
the doctrine of implied warranty of merchantability and the
new draft Restatement of the Law of Torts: Products Liability.
Most important, the decision represents unsound public policy.
Courts and legislatures throughout this country, the interna-
tional community, and the Reporters for the new Restatement of
the Law of Torts: Products Liability, have recognized that
sound public policy demands clear, uniform, single standards
for liability based on design defects and failure to warn.
For those standards to prevail they should be fault-based. 97
A return to multiple rules for design and warning liability will
cause unnecessary litigation, jury confusion, chill innovation,
and perhaps worst of all destroy what should be a cornerstone
of the common law-common sense.
The New York Court of appeals is sophisticated enough to
recognize the error of its ways. Respectfully, the Court should
overrule Denny and the Court's opinion should be ignored by
courts of other states.
96. Id.
97. See Death of "Super Strict Liability," supra note 72, at 179.
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